Abstract: To estimate the impact of grade composition on pupil achievement we exploit grade mixing rules in Norwegian junior high schools in an instrumental variable framework. We find that pupils in mixed grade classrooms outperform pupils in single grade classrooms on high stake central exit tests and teacher set and graded tests. This effect is driven by pupils benefiting from sharing the classroom with more mature peers from higher grades. We also find that the presence of lower grade peers is detrimental for achievement. Children can therefore benefit from de-tracking by grade, but the effects depend crucially on how the classroom is balanced in terms of lower and higher grades. Download this paper.
Abstract: Job characteristics can affect worker turnover through their effect on utility and through their effect on outside job opportunities. We separately identify and estimate the roles of these two channels. Our method exploits information on job changes and relies on an augmented sample selection correction. Taking our approach to an exhaustive register of Dutch primary school teachers, and using arguably plausible exclusion restrictions, we show a detailed picture of preferences for school characteristics. We also study how preference estimates may be biased when ignoring information on job opportunities and discuss the implications for the analysis of teacher turnover. Download this paper.
Abstract: Does internet use trigger sex crime? We use unique Norwegian data on crime and internet adoption to shed light on this question. A public program with limited funding rolled out broadband access points in 2000–2008, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in internet use. Our instrumental variables and fixed effect estimates show that internet use is associated with a substantial increase in reported incidences of rape and other sex crimes. We present a theoretical framework that highlights three mechanisms for how internet use may affect reported sex crime, namely a reporting effect, a matching effect on potential offenders and victims, and a direct effect on crime propensity. Our results indicate that the direct effect is non-negligible and positive, plausibly as a result of increased consumption of pornography. Download this paper.
Abstract: For a given size of an educational market, more school choice and competition in the form of more suppliers, means that suppliers will on average serve fewer pupils. This implies a trade-off between scale and competition which has been largely ignored in the economics of education literature. We study this trade-off using a large school consolidation reform in the Netherlands that decreased the supply of schools by on average 15 percent, but where the reduction in the supply of schools varied considerably across municipalities. We find that reducing the number of schools by 10 percent increases pupils’ achievement by about 3 percent of a standard deviation. We present evidence that in our setting scale effects dominate the effects of choice and competition. More generally, our results illustrate that ignoring scale effects can lead to substantial bias in general equilibrium estimates of choice and competition. Download this paper.
Abstract: In this paper we investigate how heterogeneous agents choose among tournaments with different prizes. We show that if the number of agents is sufficiently small, multiple equilibria can arise. Depending on how the prize money is split over the tournaments, these may include, for example, a perfect-sorting equilibrium in which high-ability agents compete in the high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a single tournament. However, splitting the tournament may increase the effort of low-ability agents. Download this paper.
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Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of attending medical school on health behavior and health status exploiting that admission to medical school in the Netherlands is determined by a lottery. Because lottery losers are permitted to re-apply, we use the result of the first lottery in which someone participates as instrumental variable. Our results show that health education reduces alcohol intake and being underweight, and seems to reduce smoking. It has, however, no impact on being overweight or obese, or on subjective health status. The effect on the frequency of physical exercise is even negative. This mixed evidence makes it unlikely that the content of education programs explains the education gradient for health. Health education has a large impact on the probability of being registered for donations of organs, suggesting that information provision is a possible channel to raise the supply of organs. Download this paper.
Abstract: To stimulate investment in training by individuals, the Dutch tax system allows a deduction of direct training expenditures from taxable income. This paper investigates to what extent the resulting cost reduction encourages training investments. Two different identification strategies are used. The first strategy uses the progressive structure of the income tax scheme and compares groups with taxable income just above or just below kinks. The second strategy takes advantage of the 2001 tax reform, which implied substantial changes in marginal tax rates. These strategies exploit different sources of exogenous variation and are based on different identifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the results point in the same direction: tax incentives increase training participation. Download this paper.
Abstract: This paper investigates how a policy that is aimed to increase the labor force attachment of older teachers affects their labor supply and absenteeism. The policy allows teachers older than 52 to reduce their working hours by 10% at the cost of a 3.5% salary reduction. When teachers turn 56 they can reduce their work load by another 10% at the same cost. This measure therefore introduces a change in teachers budget constraints the moment they turn 52 respectively 56. This paper uses cross-sectional and longitudinal variation to assess the effect of this policy on teachers labor supply and the subsequent effect on absenteeism. Download this paper.